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Les implications budgétaires de l'union monétaire

Listed author(s):
  • Charles Wyplosz
  • Jean Pisani- Ferry

[fre] L'unification économique et monétaire de l'Europe a des implications majeures en matière de politique budgétaire. En effet, l'union monétaire étant caractérisée par l'existence d'un taux d'intérêt réel uniforme, les conséquences des politiques budgétaires transiteront, non plus par des ajustements de changes, mais par des variations des niveaux absolus de prix ; l'ensemble des pays membres en supportera les effets sur les taux d'intérêt réels. Dans la mesure où, dès lors qu'il existe des rigidités de prix, il faudra compenser la perte de l'instrument taux de change, il sera nécessaire de coordonner les politiques budgétaires si l'on veut éviter l'instabilité et les actions non coopératives. Mais contrairement aux recommandations du rapport Delors, ceci n'implique pas en général que l'on doive renforcer la « discipline budgétaire » en instaurant des plafonds sur les déficits publics des États membres. Ces aspects, alliés aux risques de concurrence fiscale entre pays et à la généralisation des externalités qui devraient aller de pair avec l'intégration croissante des marchés, plaident en faveur d'une augmentation substantielle du budget communautaire. [eng] The European economic and monetary union has one major implication on fiscal policy. Indeed the monetary union being caracterized by uniform real interest rates, fiscal policies will not affect anymore exchange rates, but the prices levels ; the EEC countries will have to bear the consequences on real interest rates. Consequently, since prices rigidities do exist, it will be necessary to compensate the loss of exchange rate instrument by coordinating fiscal policies to avoid instability and non cooperative actions. But, contrary to the recommandation of Mr Delor's report, the paper shows that this dees not imply the reinforcing of fiscal discipline by creating an upper limit to the public deficits of member countries. Theses aspects, together with the risks of fiscal competitivity among countries and whith the generalisation of externalities which should accompany the increasing market integration, are in favour of a substantial increase of the EEC budget.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Observations et diagnostics économiques : revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 33 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 155-173

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1990_num_33_1_1678
Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1990.1678
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  1. Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Economics Working Papers 90-132, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1987. "Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Cohen Daniel & Wyplosz Ch., 1990. "Price and trade effects of exchange rates fluctuations and the design of policy coordination," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9010, CEPREMAP.
  4. repec:fth:harver:1437 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Case, A.C. & Hines, J.R.J. & Rosen, H.S., 1989. "Copycatting: Fiscal Policies Of States And Their Neighbors," Papers 37, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  6. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1984. "Perspectives on High World Real Interest Rates," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 15(2), pages 273-334.
  7. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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