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Ouverture à la concurrence des activités en réseau. Le cas du transport aérien européen

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  • David Encaoua

Abstract

[fre] L'objet de cet article est d'analyser les effets de la libéralisation du transport aérien en Europe. Chaque compagnie aérienne a un réseau de liaisons directes et indirectes connectant différents aéroports nationaux et internationaux à partir d'un aéroport central qu'elle domine largement. Cette structure conduit à quelques conclusions intéressantes. Premièrement, une concurrence frontale entre compa­gnies nationales sur un réseau intégré apparaît peu probable. Deuxièmement, il existe des complémentarités de coûts entre les différentes liaisons d'un même réseau donnant lieu à des « extemalités d'offre ». En troisième lieu, des « extemalités de demande » sont également présentes du fait que les consomma­teurs ont des possibilités d'arbitrage, aussi bien en ce qui concerne le choix de leur trajet que pour celui de la compagnie. [eng] The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of the gradual process of libe­ralization of the Community air transport market. The european airlines networks have mainly a "hub and spoke" structure inherited from geography and previous regulation. It is argued that nose-to-nose competition between the major Commu­nity flag carriers is rather unlikely. Two network effects are analysed. The first one is a "supply-side" network effect arising from cost complementarities. The second network effect is a "demand-side" one. Due to their preferences on time schedule, frequency and quality of the service, travellers face some arbitrage for the choice of the carrier and of the type of routing in some intra-european markets. These two network effects are used to analyse the consequences of a merger and of a coo­perative agreement between two airlines.

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  • David Encaoua, 1996. "Ouverture à la concurrence des activités en réseau. Le cas du transport aérien européen," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(6), pages 1269-1296.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_6_409850
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409850
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409850
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    2. Dobruszkes, Frédéric, 2009. "Does liberalisation of air transport imply increasing competition? Lessons from the European case," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 29-39, January.

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