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Privatisation et incitations

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  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

Abstract

[eng] We discuss the application of the usual arguments in favor or against privati­zation, in the case of a natural monopoly. Then, we give two classical examples of trade-offs -public - private ownership - in specific contexts of contractual incom­pleteness. Finally, we sketch a theory of privatization based on political economy considerations. [fre] Nous discutons l'application des arguments habituels avancés dans les débats sur la privatisation au cas d'un monopole naturel et nous montrons la nécessité du cadre théorique des contrats incomplets. Ensuite, nous présentons deux exemples classiques de choix entre monopole public ou privé dans des con­textes spécifiques d'incomplétude contractuelle. Enfin, nous esquissons une théo­rie de la privatisation fondée sur des considérations d'économie politique.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996. "Privatisation et incitations," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(6), pages 1239-1251.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_6_409848
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409848
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409848
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    4. Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
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    1. Thierry Verdier & Carlos Winograd, 1998. "Privatisation de masse et macroéconomie : un modèle théorique d'une petite économie ouverte," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(1), pages 257-275.
    2. Barbosa, Alexandro & Lima, Severino Cesário de & Brusca, Isabel, 2016. "Governance and efficiency in the Brazilian water utilities: A dynamic analysis in the process of universal access," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PA), pages 82-96.
    3. Hofman, Lucile & Plane, Patrick, 2001. "Électricité en Afrique et performance productive," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(3), pages 385-408, septembre.
    4. Patrick PLANE, 2003. "Privatisation et réseaux d'électricité en Afrique de l'Ouest francophone : une évaluation rétrospective," Working Papers 200322, CERDI.
    5. Barbosa, Alexandro & Brusca, Isabel, 2015. "Governance structures and their impact on tariff levels of Brazilian water and sanitation corporations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 94-105.

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