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What Prudential Surveillance for the Financial Services Industry?

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Listed:
  • Dominique Plihon

Abstract

[eng] This article deals with two sets of questions : what should be the fundamental principles of prudential regulation ? And : is there an optimal form of prudential regulation ? What should be the role of central banks ? Should there be one and only institution (as in UK with the FSA) ? The answer depends on the way you consider markets : if there is indeed imperfection, public regulation should be important. . JEL Classifications : G18, G20

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Plihon, 2000. "What Prudential Surveillance for the Financial Services Industry?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 60(5), pages 17-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_1767-4603_2000_num_60_5_4502
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.4502
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.4502
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

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