IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Cible de niveau de prix versus cible d'inflation : état des lieux et perspectives

  • Ludovic Aubert
  • Didier Eyssartier
Registered author(s):

    [fre] Une Banque centrale doit-elle cibler l’inflation ou plutôt le niveau des prix afin de maximiser le bien-être social ? Cet article fait un point sur cette question qui s’est essentiellement posée, dans un cadre nouveau keynésien, caractérisé par la présence de rigidités nominales et d’anticipations rationnelles. Tout d’abord, cet article expose les mécanismes inhérents aux deux types de cible. Puis il donne un rapide aperçu des enjeux sur lesquels les études sur ce thème se sont principalement concentrées. Les auteurs introduisent ensuite la notion de crédibilité de la politique monétaire dans un environnement nouveau keynésien dont une bonne compréhension est nécessaire à l’intuition des résultats sur le choix de la cible. Enfin, la discussion est élargie en introduisant différents aspects complémentaires susceptibles d’être résolus plus efficacement sous une cible de niveau de prix. Classification JEL : E5, E52, [eng] Price level versus inflation targeting : achievement and challenges Should a central Bank target the inflation or rather the price level to maximise the social welfare ? This article analyses this question which is essentially set in a new keynesian framework, characterised by nominal rigidities and rational anticipations. First, this article exposes inherent mechanisms to the two types of target. Then it gives an outline of the stakes on which the studies on this subject mainly focused. The authors introduce then the notion of credibility of the monetary policy into a new keynesian environment, a good understanding of which is necessary for the intuition of the results on the choice of the target. Finally, the discussion is widened by introducing various additional aspects susceptible to be more effectively resolved under a price level targeting. JEL classifications : E5, E52.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

    Volume (Year): 65 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 201-227

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2002_num_65_1_3774
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2002.3774
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 67(0), pages 1-35, Supplemen.
    2. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Bennett T. McCallum, 1997. "Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Working Papers 6016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Michael Ehrmann, 2002. "Does Inflation Targeting Increase Output Volatility?: An International Comparison of Policymakers' Preferences and Outcomes," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 9, pages 247-274 Central Bank of Chile.
    5. Clarida, R. & Gali, J. & Gertler, M., 1998. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and some Theory," Working Papers 98-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    6. Robert Dittmar & William T. Gavin, 1999. "What do New-Keynesian Phillips Curves imply for price level targeting?," Working Papers 1999-021, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    7. Fuhrer, Jeffrey C, 1997. "The (Un)Importance of Forward-Looking Behavior in Price Specifications," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 338-50, August.
    8. Friedman, Benjamin M, 1999. "The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as an Army with Only a Signal Corps?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 321-38, November.
    9. Benjamin M. Friedman, 1999. "The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as an Army With Only a Signal Corps," NBER Working Papers 7420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Michael Woodford, 2000. "Pitfalls of Forward-Looking Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 100-104, May.
    11. Roberts, John M, 1995. "New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 975-84, November.
    12. Smets, Frank, 2000. "What horizon for price stability," Working Paper Series 0024, European Central Bank.
    13. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
    14. Robert King & Alexander L. Wolman, 1999. "What Should the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 349-404 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Summers, Lawrence, 1991. "How Should Long-Term Monetary Policy Be Determined? Panel Discussion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 625-31, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2002_num_65_1_3774. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.