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La mise en oeuvre de la réglementation : une lecture économico-juridique du secteur électrique et des marchés publics

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  • Frédéric Marty
  • Thierry Kirat

Abstract

[eng] The basic idea of the paper is that the empirical meaning of rules is far from being totally contained in their initial statement. The article concentrates on the economic scope of rules and regulations, and their implementation by players such as the State bureaucracy, regulatory agencies, and courts. The empirical analysis concerns electric utilities and public procurement, with a focus on defense procurement. We begin by examining a key issue : how does the institutional architecture of regulation systems operate ? We then address the implementation of rules, which emerges as a more complex process than a mere enforcement of rules prescribing specific types of behavior. [fre] L’article part de l’idée que le sens des règles n’est pas entièrement contenu dans leur formulation initiale. Il s’intéresse à la portée économique de la réglementation et au processus de mise en œuvre des règles, notamment par l’administration, les régulateurs spécialisés et les tribunaux. L’analyse porte sur une industrie de réseau (le secteur électrique ) et les marchés publics, en particulier de la Défense. Le texte envisage successivement l’architecture institutionnelle des systèmes de réglementation et des conditions dans lesquelles ils opèrent, puis la mise en œuvre des règles, qui constitue un processus plus complexe qu’une simple application de règles prescrivant des comportements.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Marty & Thierry Kirat, 2006. "La mise en oeuvre de la réglementation : une lecture économico-juridique du secteur électrique et des marchés publics," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 175(4), pages 101-116.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2006_num_175_4_7565
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2006.7565
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2006.7565
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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