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La mise en œuvre de la réglementation : une lecture économico-juridique du secteur électrique et des marchés publics

Listed author(s):
  • Thierry Kirat
  • Frédéric Marty

The basic idea of the paper is that the empirical meaning of rules is far from being totally contained in their initial statement. The article concentrates on the economic scope of rules and regulations, and their implementation by players such as the State bureaucracy, regulatory agencies, and courts. The empiricalanalysis concernselectricutilitiesand public procurement, with a focus on defense procurement. We begin by examining a key issue: how does the institutional architecture of regulation systems operate? We then address the implementation of rules, which emerges as a more complex process than a mere enforcement of rules prescribing specific types of behavior.

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Article provided by La Documentation Française in its journal Economie & prévision.

Volume (Year): n° 175-176 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 101-116

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Handle: RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_175_0101
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economie-et-prevision.htm

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  1. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
  2. Thierry Kirat & Denis Bayon, 2004. "Contrats d'acquisition, maintenance et coût global depossession : comparaisons dans le domaine aéronautiqueentre la France, le Royaume-Uni, les Etats-Unis et l'OTAN," Post-Print halshs-00004201, HAL.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
  4. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
  5. Thierry Kirat, 2003. "L'Allocation Des Risques Dans Les Contrats :," Post-Print halshs-00004535, HAL.
  6. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
  7. Stigler, George J, 1992. "Law or Economics?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 455-468, October.
  8. Severin Borenstein, 2002. "The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 191-211, Winter.
  9. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
  10. Jean-Michel Glachant, 2000. "Les pays d'Europe peuvent-ils reproduire la réforme électrique de l'Angleterre ? Une analyse institutionnelle comparative," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 157-168.
  11. Thierry Kirat & Denis Bayon & Blanc Hélène, 2003. "Maîtriser les coûts des programmes d'armement," Post-Print halshs-00004239, HAL.
  12. Simon Deakin & Stephen Pratten, 1999. "Reinventing the Market? Competition and Regulatory Change in Broadcasting," Working Papers wp134, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
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