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La théorie des contrats implicites : bilan et perspectives


  • Anne Perrot


[eng] The Implicit Contracts Theory: Results and Prospects, . by Anne Perrot.. . By using a simple model, this paper presents the idea behind the implicit contracts theory to explain why wage agreements are so rigid and why involuntary unemployment exists: the hiring process is considered to be an insurance policy whereby firms, either neutral or relatively unexposed to risk, insure wage earners, who are more exposed to risk, against fluctuations in their income. The result is rigidity in wages and perhaps involuntary unemployment. These results are discussed in comparison with other hypotheses on the nature of agreements and constraints on the agents (areas of employment, benefits paid to the unemployed,...). Such agreements can be responsible for cases of over-employment. [fre] La théorie des contrats implicites: bilan et perspectives, . par Anne Perrot.. . Cet article présente, dans le cas d'un modèle simple, l'idée qui est à la base de la théorie des contrats pour expliquer la rigidité des salaires et l'existence de chômage involontaire : la relation d'embauché est conçue comme une procédure d'assurance où la firme, neutre ou peu sensible au risque, assure les salariés, plus sensibles au risque, contre les fluctuations de leur revenu. Il en résulte une rigidité du salaire ainsi que, peut-être, du chômage involontaire. La robustesse des résultats, face à des hypothèses alternatives sur la nature du contrat et des contraintes subies par les agents, est discutée (Existence de bassins d emploi, indemnités versées aux chômeurs,...). Il apparaît, en conclusion, que l'existence de contrats peut engendrer des situations de suremploi. [ger] Die Theorie der vert rag lie h en Implikationen : Bilanz und Perspektiven, . von Anne Perrot.. . Dieser Artikel stellt für den Fall eines einfachen Modells die der Vertragstheorie zugrundeliegende Idee yor, die die starre Lohnstruktur und das Vorhandensein unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit erklären kann : der Eintritt in ein Beschâftigungsverhältnis wird wie ein Versicherungsabschluss aufgefasst, durch den der hinsichtlich des Risikos neutrale oder in geringem Masse bewusste Betrieb den risikobewussteren Lohnempfängern eine Garantie gegen Einkommensschwankungen verbürgt. Eine starre Lohnstruktur sowie vielleicht unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit sind die Folgen. Die weitere Untersuchung gilt der Beständigkeit der Resultate angesichts alternativer Hypothesen zur Struktur des Vertragsverhältnisses und zu den Zwängen, die den Vertragspartnern auferlegt sind (Bestehen von Arbeitsmarktregionen, Arbeitslosengeld...). Anschliessend wird herausgestellt, dass das Bestehen von Verträgen Überbeschäftigungs-situationen verursachen kann. [spa] La teoría de los contratos implícitos : balance y perspectivas, . por Anne Perrot.. . Este artículo présenta, en el caso de un modelo simple, la idea de fondo de la teoría de los contratos para explicar la rigidez de los salarios y la existencia de desocupación involuntaria : la relación contractual está considerada como una garantía en donde la firma, neutra o poco sensible al riesgo, asegura a los asalariados, más sensibles al riesgo, contra las fluctuaciones de su ingreso. Asi resulta una rigidez del salario, y tal vez, de la desocupación involuntaria. La solidez de los resultados, frente a hipótesis alternativas sobre el carácter del contrato y de las exigencias soportadas por los agentes, se halla en discusión (Existencia de reservas de empleo, indemnizaciones para desempleados,...). En conclusion, parece ser que la existencia de contratos puede generar situaciones de sobrempleo.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Perrot, 1990. "La théorie des contrats implicites : bilan et perspectives," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 15-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5153
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5153

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Taylor, John B, 1980. "Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 1-23, February.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    3. Newbery, David M & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "Wage Rigidity, Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and Economic Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 416-430, June.
    4. Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1979. "Wage Indexing Rules and the Behavior of the Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 798-815, August.
    5. repec:adr:anecst:y:1986:i:2:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    7. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-1175, September.
    8. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Louis Lhéritier, 1992. "Les déterminants du salaire," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 257(1), pages 9-21.
    2. Sylvie Le Minez, 2002. "Topographie des secteurs d'activité à partir des flux de mobilité intersectorielle des salariés," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 354(1), pages 49-83.

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