IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlaop/v2013y2013i4id410p49-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reflection of the Election Cycle in Public Procurement in Prague

Author

Listed:
  • Petra Drzková

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to reveal whether there is a relation between public procurement and the election cycle in Prague. The examined data cover the period from 2005 to 2011. Two hypotheses have been set in order to discover whether there is such a relation. The first one postulates that public procurement is used for construction, wellvisible investment, so as to increase the probability of being re-elected. The second hypothesis marks the effort of politicians to maximise their own benefits until the end of their electoral term as the main reason for contracting public procurement. The hypotheses are proven with the number of public procurement projects, the total amount of money spent on public procurement in a particular term, the average amount of bids and the relation between the final and expected price. Regression analysis was used as the tool for verifi - cation. The result is that it is possible to find such a relation dependence of supplies and services and the election cycle in Prague.

Suggested Citation

  • Petra Drzková, 2013. "Reflection of the Election Cycle in Public Procurement in Prague," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2013(4), pages 49-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2013:y:2013:i:4:id:410:p:49-68
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.vse.cz/polek/download.php?jnl=aop&pdf=410.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    File URL: http://www.vse.cz/aop/410
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corruption; public procurement; election cycle; Prague; re-election; linear regression model;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2013:y:2013:i:4:id:410:p:49-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.