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How a “Smart regulatory” platform can improve the property fee adjustment dilemma

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Listed:
  • Dekun Dong
  • Shuang Li

Abstract

In the current process of social and economic development, the cost of living and property management is continuously increasing. In order to maintain the normal operation of property management and provide high-quality services, it is necessary to adjust the property fees reasonably. If the property fees cannot be adjusted for a long time, it will have a detrimental impact on the development of the community. However, the traditional regulatory model has failed to accurately define the quality of property services, leading to information asymmetry and a lack of trust between the two parties, resulting in a deadlock in property fee adjustments. With the rise of intelligent management, a new direction for property fee adjustments has been provided. This article first analyzes the pricing dilemma under traditional regulation through game theory. Then, based on the theory of “Smart regulatory”, it proposes the idea of constructing a "Smart regulatory" platform and explores the feasibility of this model using game theory and Matlab simulations. The study found that the “Smart regulatory” platform can resolve information asymmetry and encourage both parties to cooperate in the game. After the establishment of the platform, property fee adjustments are influenced by government supervision, government penalties, and the magnitude of property fee increase.

Suggested Citation

  • Dekun Dong & Shuang Li, 2023. "How a “Smart regulatory” platform can improve the property fee adjustment dilemma," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(11), pages 1-18, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0294920
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0294920
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Peter Gossum & Bas Arts & Kris Verheyen, 2010. "From “smart regulation” to “regulatory arrangements”," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 43(3), pages 245-261, September.
    3. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
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