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The perils of plurality rule in democratic presidential systems: A replication and extension

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  • Joshua Holzer

Abstract

Recent research suggests that country-years where presidents won their previous election with an absolute majority are more likely to be associated with high government respect for human rights, in comparison to country-years where presidents won their previous election by a mere plurality. With this follow-up article, I replicate these findings with a greatly expanded dataset, and I explore whether country-years where presidents have been elected using a majoritarian system are more likely to be associated with high government respect for human rights, in comparison to country-years where presidents have been elected using a non-majoritarian system. Ultimately, I find that not only are presidents elected with a plurality associated with comparatively lower levels of human rights respect, but so are presidents elected via a non-majoritarian system. These findings suggest that policymakers seeking to improve human rights practices may want to consider directing their efforts towards promoting electoral reform with an emphasis on mandating a minimum of a majority in order to win an election.

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  • Joshua Holzer, 2022. "The perils of plurality rule in democratic presidential systems: A replication and extension," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-13, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0262026
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0262026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson, 1998. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," International Economic Association Series, in: Silvio Borner & Martin Paldam (ed.), The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, chapter 3, pages 38-73, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Prithviraj Guha & Arindam Mandal & Aniruddha Mitra, 2021. "Do labor rights help to protect human rights? An empirical exploration," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(2), pages 161-164, January.
    3. Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 593-629, July.
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