Is a Refundable Deductible Insurance an advantage for the insured? a mathematical approach
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DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0247030
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Claramunt, M. Mercè & Costa, Teresa & Mármol, Maite & Varea, Xavier, 2024. "Household Refundable Utility by taking out refundable insurance: Empirical study in the Spanish auto insurance market," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
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