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People making deontological judgments in the Trapdoor dilemma are perceived to be more prosocial in economic games than they actually are

Author

Listed:
  • Valerio Capraro
  • Jonathan Sippel
  • Bonan Zhao
  • Levin Hornischer
  • Morgan Savary
  • Zoi Terzopoulou
  • Pierre Faucher
  • Simone F Griffioen

Abstract

Why do people make deontological decisions, although they often lead to overall unfavorable outcomes? One account is receiving considerable attention: deontological judgments may signal commitment to prosociality and thus may increase people’s chances of being selected as social partners–which carries obvious long-term benefits. Here we test this framework by experimentally exploring whether people making deontological judgments are expected to be more prosocial than those making consequentialist judgments and whether they are actually so. In line with previous studies, we identified deontological choices using the Trapdoor dilemma. Using economic games, we take two measures of general prosociality towards strangers: trustworthiness and altruism. Our results procure converging evidence for a perception gap according to which Trapdoor-deontologists are believed to be more trustworthy and more altruistic towards strangers than Trapdoor-consequentialists, but actually they are not so. These results show that deontological judgments are not universal, reliable signals of prosociality.

Suggested Citation

  • Valerio Capraro & Jonathan Sippel & Bonan Zhao & Levin Hornischer & Morgan Savary & Zoi Terzopoulou & Pierre Faucher & Simone F Griffioen, 2018. "People making deontological judgments in the Trapdoor dilemma are perceived to be more prosocial in economic games than they actually are," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(10), pages 1-16, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0205066
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0205066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laura Biziou-van-Pol & Jana Haenen & Arianna Novaro & Andrés Occhipinti & Valerio Capraro, 2015. "Does telling white lies signal pro-social preferences?," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 10(6), pages 538-548, November.
    2. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2013. "When do we lie?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 258-265.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dhaliwal, Nathan A. & Patil, Indrajeet & Cushman, Fiery, 2021. "Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 27-51.
    2. Valerio Capraro, 2025. "Evaluation 2 of "Ends versus Means: Kantians, Utilitarians, and Moral Decisions"," The Unjournal Evaluations 2025-52, The Unjournal.
    3. Kean-Siang Ch’ng & Suresh Narayanan, 2023. "Evaluating the trustworthiness of employees: are choices made as actors perceived as a more reliable signal of trustworthiness?," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 50(3), pages 271-284, September.
    4. Mata, André & Vaz, André & Mendonça, Bernardo, 2022. "Deliberate ignorance in moral dilemmas: Protecting judgment from conflicting information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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