Teorías De La Evolución Del Comportamiento Cooperativo: Una Revisión Crítica
In this paper we survey the theories of gratuitous cooperation, i.e., in favour of non-relatives and without repeated interaction. We also describe our work on the area, whose objective is to integrate the various theories of gratuitous cooperation into a self-contained framework. Our conclusions are as follows. First: altruistic punishment, conformism, and gratuitous cooperation coevolve, and group selection is a necessary for the coevolution to take place. Second: people do not cooperate by mistake, as most theories imply. On the contrary, people knowingly sacrifice themselves for others. Third: in cooperative dilemmas conformism is an expression of preference, not a learning rule. Fourth: group mutations are necessary to sustain cooperation in the long-run.
Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Marcus W. Feldman & Kenichi Aoki & Jochen Kumm, 1996. "Individual Versus Social Learning: Evolutionary Analysis in a Fluctuating Environment," Working Papers 96-05-030, Santa Fe Institute.
- Samuel Bowles & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2000. "The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions," Working Papers 00-12-073, Santa Fe Institute.
- Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, .
"Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment,"
IEW - Working Papers
016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
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