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Market Valuation of Illiquid Debt and Implications for Conflicts among Creditors

Author

Listed:
  • Leonardo Bartolini

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Avinash Dixit

    (International Monetary Fund)

Abstract

We develop a formula for the market value of debt when the borrower's repayment capacity varies stochastically and shortfalls are rolled over. The value of a marginal dollar of nominal claim is an S-shaped function of the ratio of the repayment capacity to the amount of nominal debt. Shifts of this curve are examined in response to changes in the underlying parameters. The calculations bring out conflicts of interest among lenders of differing degrees of seniority. Most surprisingly, junior creditors gain when the loan is rescheduled on terms more favorable to the debtor.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo Bartolini & Avinash Dixit, 1991. "Market Valuation of Illiquid Debt and Implications for Conflicts among Creditors," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 38(4), pages 828-849, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:38:y:1991:i:4:p:828-849
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    Cited by:

    1. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2014. "The role of creditor seniority in Europe's sovereign debt crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 29(79), pages 495-552, July.
    2. Pierre Mella-Barral & Pierre Tychon, 1996. "Default Risk in Asset Pricing," FMG Discussion Papers dp250, Financial Markets Group.
    3. Hayri, Aydin, 2000. "Debt relief," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 137-152, October.
    4. Michael P. Dooley & Sujata Verma, 2003. "Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises," NBER Chapters,in: Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 125-186 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Michael Dooley & Mark R. Stone, 1993. "Endogenous Creditor Seniority and External Debt Values," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(2), pages 395-413, June.
    6. Claessens, Stijn & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1990. "Pricing average price options for the 1990 Mexican and Venezuelan recapture clauses," Policy Research Working Paper Series 541, The World Bank.
    7. Sven Steinkamp & Frank Westermann, 2012. "On Creditor Seniority and Sovereign Bond Prices in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 3944, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Claessens,Constantijn A.*Pennacchi, George, 1992. "Deriving developing country repayment capacity from the market prices of sovereign debt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1043, The World Bank.
    9. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 2000. "Sovereign Liquidity Crises: The Strategic Case for a Payments Standstill," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 335-362, January.
    10. Kim Oosterlinck & Loredana Ureche-Rangau, 2005. "Entre la peste et le choléra : le détenteur d’obligations peut préférer la répudiation au défaut…," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 79(2), pages 309-331.
    11. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69, June.
    12. Michael Bowe & James W. Dean, 1997. "Debt-equity swaps and the enforcement of sovereign loan contracts," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(1), pages 59-83.
    13. Cohen, Daniel, 1996. "The sustainability of African debt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1621, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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