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Carbon Taxes and Climate Commitment with Non-constant Time Preference

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  • Terrence Iverson
  • Larry Karp

Abstract

We study the Markov perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game where agents have non-constant time preference, decentralized households determine aggregate savings, and a planner chooses climate policy. The article is the first to solve this problem with general discounting and general functional forms. With time-inconsistent preferences, a commitment device that allows a planner to choose climate policy for multiple periods is potentially very valuable. Nevertheless, our quantitative results show that while a permanent commitment device would be very valuable, the ability to commit policy for “only” 100 years adds less than 2% to the value of climate policy without commitment. We solve a log-linear version of the model analytically, generating a formula for the optimal carbon tax that includes the formula in Golosov et al. (2014, Econometrica, 82, 41–88) as a special case. More importantly, we develop new algorithms to solve the general game numerically. Convex damages lead to strategic interactions across generations of planners that lower the optimal carbon tax by 45% relative to the scenario without strategic interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Terrence Iverson & Larry Karp, 2021. "Carbon Taxes and Climate Commitment with Non-constant Time Preference," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 764-799.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:2:p:764-799.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdaa048
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    Cited by:

    1. Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2022. "Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Moritz A. Drupp & Frikk Nesje & Robert C. Schmidt & Robert Christian Schmidt, 2022. "Pricing Carbon," CESifo Working Paper Series 9608, CESifo.
    3. Nesje, Frikk, 2024. "Cross-dynastic intergenerational altruism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    4. Jinchi Dong & Richard S. J. Tol & Fangzhi Wang, 2024. "Towards a representative social cost of carbon," Papers 2404.04989, arXiv.org.
    5. Gerlagh, Reyer, 2022. "Climate, Technology, Family Size; on the Crossroad between Two Ultimate Externalities," Other publications TiSEM b6d5b02f-4624-46fd-836a-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Gerlagh, Reyer, 2023. "Climate, technology, family size; on the crossroad between two ultimate externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    7. Yang, Yang & He, Weijun & Jiang, Ningye & Xu, Shasha & Ramsey, Thomas Stephen & Yuan, Liang, 2024. "The intertemporal choice study of individual water-saving irrigation construction under three water pricing and subsidy scenarios," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 295(C).
    8. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rezai, Armon, 2021. "Optimal carbon pricing in general equilibrium: Temperature caps and stranded assets in an extended annual DSGE model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    9. Rising, James A. & Taylor, Charlotte & Ives, Matthew C. & Ward, Robert E.T., 2022. "Challenges and innovations in the economic evaluation of the risks of climate change," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    10. Richard Jaimes, 2023. "Optimal climate and fiscal policy in an OLG economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 727-752, August.
    11. Arnaud Goussebaïle, 2024. "Democratic Climate Policies with Overlapping Generations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(5), pages 1249-1273, May.
    12. Gerlagh, Reyer, 2022. "Climate, Technology, Family Size; on the Crossroad between Two Ultimate Externalities," Discussion Paper 2022-027, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Sheng, Pengfei & Liu, Weiliang, 2024. "Does the government's green commitment matter for energy conservation in China? The role of public spending," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 1061-1073.
    14. Rising, James A. & Taylor, Charlotte & Ives, Matthew C. & Ward, Robert E.t., 2022. "Challenges and innovations in the economic evaluation of the risks of climate change," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 114941, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    15. Kalk, Andrei & Sorger, Gerhard, 2023. "Climate policy under political pressure," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    16. Amer Ahmed & Esther Bartl, 2024. "Loan Choice and Indebtedness of Bangladeshi Return Migrants," Working Paper Series 0824, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    17. Arvaniti, Maria & Krishnamurthy, Chandra Kiran B. & Crépin, Anne-Sophie, 2023. "Time-consistent renewable resource management with present bias and regime shifts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 479-495.

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