IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxford/v22y2006i2p169-185.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden

Author

Listed:
  • Dieter Helm

Abstract

This paper provides a critique of broad aggregate proposals to reduce the regulatory burden. It argues that the public debate about regulatory reform and red tape is loose and general, with little regard for the complex ways in which regulation imposes costs and benefits on the economy. Although there are theoretical reasons to expect regulation to be in excess supply, there is little empirical analysis to link aggregate regulation with productivity and economic growth. Regulation is itself a public good, and many aspects of economic efficiency require regulation to address market failures. The main efficiency issues are better addressed through a disaggregated approach, focusing on when, where, and how to regulate, rather than on crude aggregate estimates of the total burden. The design of regulation needs to take account of regulatory capture, and it is argued that market-based instruments and independent regulatory bodies tend to reduce the scope for capture. The incentives and employment rules governing regulatory institutions are also discussed. In ignoring these disaggregated regulatory design problems, crude aggregate targets for the reduction of regulation, and rules such as 'one in, one out' may be counter-productive. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dieter Helm, 2006. "Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 169-185, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:169-185
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sarr, Mare & Goeschl, Timo & Swanson, Tim, 2008. "The value of conserving genetic resources for R&D: A survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 184-193, September.
    2. Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2002. "The Social Value of Biodiversity for R&D," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(4), pages 477-504, August.
    3. Daan van Soest & Robert Lensink, 2000. "Foreign Transfers and Tropical Deforestation: What Terms of Conditionality?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(2), pages 389-399.
    4. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    5. Rupert Gatti & Timo Goeschl & Ben Groom & Timothy Swanson, 2011. "The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 609-628, April.
    6. Swanson, Timothy, 1996. "The reliance of northern economies on southern biodiversity: biodiversity as information," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-8, April.
    7. Angelsen, Arild & Kaimowitz, David, 1999. "Rethinking the Causes of Deforestation: Lessons from Economic Models," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 73-98, February.
    8. Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1247-1280, November.
    9. Labbate, Gabriel, 2008. "The incremental cost principle and the conservation of globally important habitats: A critical examination," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 216-224, April.
    10. Southgate, Douglas & Salazar-Canelos, Pablo & Camacho-Saa, Carlos & Stewart, Rigoberto, 2000. "Markets, Institutions, and Forestry: The Consequences of Timber Trade Liberalization in Ecuador," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2005-2012, November.
    11. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the World Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(2), pages 253-266, April.
    12. Scott Barrett, 1994. "The biodiversity supergame," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 111-122, February.
    13. Copeland, Brian R., 1990. "Strategic enhancement and destruction of fisheries and the environment in the presence of international externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 213-226, November.
    14. Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher & McAusland, Carol, 2004. "On trade, land-use, and biodiversity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 911-925, September.
    15. John K. Stranlund, 1999. "Sunk Capital and Negotiated Resolutions of Environmental Conflicts," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 75(1), pages 142-155.
    16. Timo Goeschl & Timothy Swanson, 2003. "On Biology and Technology: The Economics of Managing Biotechnologies," Working Papers 2003.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    17. Jerrell Richer & John K. Stranlund, 1997. "Threat Positions and the Resolution of Environmental Conflicts," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 73(1), pages 58-71.
    18. Susanne Droege & Birgit Soete, 2001. "Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, North-South Trade, and Biological Diversity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 149-163, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Harrison & Inga Zaksauskienė, 2016. "Counter-intelligence in a command economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(1), pages 131-158, February.
    2. Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp & Sunil Sharma, 2010. "A framework for financial market development," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 107-135.
    3. Michael, Bryane & Gubin, Alexey, 2012. "Compliance Audit of Anti-Corruption Regulations: A Case Study from Carpatistan Customs," MPRA Paper 44693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Shaun Elder, 2014. "Does the GFC as a change agent of financial regulatory models and approaches in Europe provide lessons for Asia?," Asia Europe Journal, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 419-430, December.
    5. He Wei Ping, 2013. "Regulatory capture in China's banking sector," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 14(1), pages 80-90, January.
    6. Aad Correljé & Martijn Groenleer & Jasper Veldman, 2013. "Understanding institutional change: the development of institutions for the regulation of natural gas transportation systems in the US and the EU," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/07, European University Institute.
    7. Andr�s J. Drew, 2010. "New rules, new politics, same actors � explaining policy change in the EU ETS," GRI Working Papers 29, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    8. 'Ofa, Siope Vakataki, 2009. "The WTO's telecommunications commitments and the credibility of telecommunications regulatory reforms in small island developing states," MPRA Paper 66184, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Eichfelder, Sebastian & Vaillancourt, François, 2014. "Tax compliance costs: A review of cost burdens and cost structures," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 178, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    10. Wegrich, Kai, 2009. "The administrative burden reduction policy boom in Europe: comparing mechanisms of policy diffusion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36536, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. repec:eee:enepol:v:110:y:2017:i:c:p:490-499 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Sebastian Eichfelder & François Vaillancourt, 2014. "Tax Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost Structures," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 210(3), pages 111-148, September.
    13. Cameron Hepburn, 2006. "Regulation by Prices, Quantities, or Both: A Review of Instrument Choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 226-247, Summer.
    14. Adams, Samuel & Atsu, Francis, 2015. "Assessing the distributional effects of regulation in developing countries," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 713-725.
    15. Lourdes Torres & Patricia Bachiller, 2013. "Efficiency of telecommunications companies in European countries," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 863-886, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:169-185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.