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Economic performance, creditor protection, and labour inflexibility

  • Felipe Balmaceda
  • Ronald Fischer

We present a static general equilibrium model of an open economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and there are endogenous credit constraints due to imperfect creditor protection. Improved credit protection, harder assets, and more efficient bankruptcy procedures increase output, investment, and credit penetration. Better credit protection and harder assets lead to higher interest rate spreads. In a capital constrained (unconstrained) economy, greater (lower) wealth inequality leads to higher (lower) investment and output. Interest rate spreads are lower in richer and more unequal economies in terms of their wealth distribution. We also show that increased labour protection leads to lower wages and output in the presence of credit market imperfections. Nevertheless, increased protection benefits workers in (and owners of) firms with strong balance sheets. Copyright 2010 Oxford University Press 2009 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 62 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 553-577

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:62:y:2010:i:3:p:553-577
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