IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v55y2003i3p417-439.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effects of taxation on married women's labour supply across four countries

Author

Listed:
  • Nina Smith
  • Shirley Dex
  • Jan Dirk Vlasblom
  • Tim Callan

Abstract

The labour force participation rate of married women varies considerably between European countries. There may be several explanations for this evidence. In this study, the effect of the different income tax schemes on female labour force participation is investigated and compared. A common labour supply function is estimated on cross-section household samples for each of the countries Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and East and West Germany. Based on the estimated labour supply functions, we calculate for each of the countries the hypothetical part time and full time participation rates of married women if the households were taxed by either separate or split taxation principles, as in Britain and Ireland, respectively. The results suggest that the design of the tax scheme is highly important for the economic incentives that married women face and their resulting labour supply behaviour. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Nina Smith & Shirley Dex & Jan Dirk Vlasblom & Tim Callan, 2003. "The effects of taxation on married women's labour supply across four countries," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 417-439, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:55:y:2003:i:3:p:417-439
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 98-114.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, January.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R & Oh, Seonghwan, 1993. "Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy with Private Information: Optimal Targeting Horizons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 99-117, March.
    6. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1179-1191, November.
    7. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
    8. Driffill, John & Schultz, Christian, 1992. "Wage Setting and Stabilization Policy in a Game with Renegotiation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 440-459, July.
    9. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-393, April.
    10. Cubitt, Robin P, 1992. "Monetary Policy Games and Private Sector Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 513-530, July.
    11. Lockwood, Ben & Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Designing Monetary Policy When Unemployment Persists," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 327-345, August.
    12. Minford, Patrick, 1995. "Time-Inconsistency, Democracy, and Optimal Contingent Rules," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(2), pages 195-210, April.
    13. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-206, May.
    14. Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 1387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
    16. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    17. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Levine, Paul, 1994. "Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 355-380, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bitler, Marianne P. & Gelbach, Jonah B. & Hoynes, Hilary W., 2008. "Distributional impacts of the Self-Sufficiency Project," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 748-765, April.
    2. Bargain, Olivier & Orsini, Kristian & Peichl, Andreas, 2011. "Labor Supply Elasticities in Europe and the US," IZA Discussion Papers 5820, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Solomon W. Polachek & Jun Xiang, 2009. "The Gender Pay Gap across Countries: A Human Capital Approach," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 227, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    4. Heinz Handler & Andreas Knabe & Bertrand Koebel & Margit Schratzenstaller & Sven Wehke, 2005. "The Impact of Public Budgets on Overall Productivity Growth," WIFO Working Papers 255, WIFO.
    5. Florence Jaumotte, 2003. "Female Labour Force Participation: Past Trends and Main Determinants in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 376, OECD Publishing.
    6. Barbara E. Hopkins, 2013. "Gender and provisioning under different capitalisms," Chapters,in: Handbook of Research on Gender and Economic Life, chapter 7, pages 93-112 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Mizuki Komura, 2013. "Tax reform and endogenous gender bargaining power," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 175-192, June.
    8. Margit Schratzenstaller, 2012. "Gender Budgeting im Steuersystem," Working Paper Reihe der AK Wien - Materialien zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 116, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik.
    9. Florence Jaumotte, 2005. "Les femmes sur le marché du travail : Évidence empirique sur le rôle des politiques économiques et autres déterminants dans les pays de l'OCDE," Revue économique de l'OCDE, Éditions OCDE, vol. 2003(2), pages 57-123.
    10. Moore, Winston, 2008. "The Responsiveness of Taxable Income to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates in Barbados," MPRA Paper 21583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Evridiki Tsounta, 2006. "Why Are Women Working So Much More in Canada? An International Perspective," IMF Working Papers 06/92, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Blome, Agnes, 2011. "Work/care policies in European welfare states: Continuing variety or change towards a common model?," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship Demographic Development, Social Change, and Social Capital SP I 2011-401, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    13. HÃ¥kan Selin, 2009. "The Rise in Female Employment and the Role of Tax Incentives - An Empirical Analysis of the Swedish Individual Tax Reform of 1971," CESifo Working Paper Series 2629, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:55:y:2003:i:3:p:417-439. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.