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Union-Oligopoly Sequential Bargaining: Trade and Industrial Policies

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  • Santoni, Michele

Abstract

This paper considers the efficacy and the desirability of home government tariff and subsidy policies when labour market structure and asymmetries in the firms' size matter. In a Cournot-Nash duopolistic sector, a unionized home-firm competes against a non-unionized foreign firm. The home firm-union choose wages and employment in a two-stage Nash bargaining game. The second stage corresponds to the Cournot-Nash game with the foreign firm. Firms may play in strategic substitutes or complements. As the home bargainers recognize that market shares are determined by relative marginal costs, they may use the wage stage strategically. Home government policy choices critically depend upon the bargaining structure and general equilibrium spillovers. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Santoni, Michele, 1996. "Union-Oligopoly Sequential Bargaining: Trade and Industrial Policies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 640-663, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:4:p:640-63
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Santoni, 2001. "Discriminatory procurement policy with cash limits can lower imports: an example," Departmental Working Papers 2001-03, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    2. Luís F. Costa, "undated". "Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy With Cournot Competition in the Non-Tradable Good Sector," Discussion Papers 97/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 71, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    4. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "A Note on Unionized Firms' Incentive to Integrate Vertically," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp070, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    5. M. Correa-López, 2006. "A model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0605, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. Leahy, Dermot & Montagna, Catia, 2000. "Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment: Challenging Conventional Wisdom?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages 80-92, March.
    7. Grandner, Thomas, 2000. "A note on unionized firms' incentive to integrate vertically," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 70, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    8. Michele Santoni, 2002. "Discriminatory Procurement Policy with Cash Limits," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-45, January.
    9. A. Jorge Padilla & Samuel Bentolila & Juan J. Dolado, 1996. "Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 535-564, December.
    10. Domenico Buccella, 2011. "Labor unions and economic integration: A review," Económica, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 25-89, January-D.
    11. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sudeshna Bandyopadhyay, 2001. "Efficient bargaining, welfare and strategic export policy," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(2), pages 133-149.
    12. Bipasa Datta & Huw D. Dixon, "undated". "omega - Homothetic Preferences," Discussion Papers 00/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
    13. Thomas Grandner, 2000. "Optimal Contracts for Vertically Connected, Unionized Duopolies," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp071, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    14. Datta, Bipasa & Dixon, Huw, 2000. "Linear-homothetic preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 55-61, October.
    15. Michele Santoni, 2017. "Protective Excise Taxation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 421-445, December.
    16. Grandner, Thomas, 2001. "Unions in oligopolistic, vertically connected industries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1723-1740, October.
    17. Meccheri, Nicola, 2023. "Unionised dockworkers and port ownership structure in an international oligopoly," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1326, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    18. Leahy, Dermot & Montagna, Catia, 1999. "Unionisation and Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 2260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Hong-Ren Din & Chia-Hung Sun, 2023. "Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 73-94, January.

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