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Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Decollectivization of Agriculture

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  • Carter, Michael R

Abstract

In many countries, collective agrarian reform agriculture has decollectivized through th e subdivision, or parcellation, of large-scale farms into multiple sm all holdings. While parcellation can provide an escape from a low-eff ort-low-income equilibrium in the collective, it exposes individuals to empirically-significant risk. Analysis of institutional choice in agriculture shows that parcellation is a suboptimal resolution of the incentive-risk-sharing tradeoff. As an alternative, the paper propos es partial decollectivization which combines incentives and risk shar ing in a way consistent with static productivity and long-term agrari an reform goals. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Carter, Michael R, 1987. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Decollectivization of Agriculture," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 577-595, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:39:y:1987:i:3:p:577-95
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    Cited by:

    1. Quiggin, John, 1995. "Common property in agricultural production," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 179-200, March.
    2. Guirkinger, Catherine & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Goetghebuer, Tatiana, 2015. "Productive inefficiency in extended agricultural households: Evidence from Mali," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 17-27.
    3. Deininger, Klaus, 1995. "Collective agricultural production: A solution for transition economies?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(8), pages 1317-1334, August.
    4. Larsén, Karin, 2008. "Economic consequences of collaborative arrangements in the agricultural firm," Department of Economics publications 1740, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics.
    5. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 1996. "Theory of the firm: applied mechanism design," Working Paper 96-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    6. Chen, Jing & Rozelle, Scott, 2003. "Market Emergence And The Rise And Fall Of Backyard Hog Production In China," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21969, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Gong, Yazhen & Bull, Gary & Baylis, Kathy, 2010. "Participation in the world's first clean development mechanism forest project: The role of property rights, social capital and contractual rules," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(6), pages 1292-1302, April.
    8. Matthieu Delpierre & Catherine Guirkinger & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2012. "Risk as Impediment to Privatization? The Role of Collective Fields in Extended Agricultural Households," Working Papers 1211, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    9. Josef C. Brada & Jose A. Mendez, 2009. "Technology, Effort and the Efficiency of Production: Labor-managed versus Capitalist Firms," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 7(1), pages 35-53.
    10. Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel, 2002. "Farm Strategy, Self-Selection and Productivity: Can Small Farming Groups Offer Production Benefits to Farmers in Post-Socialist Romania?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(10), pages 1737-1753, October.
    11. Guirkinger, Catherine & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "Transformation of the family farm under rising land pressure: A theoretical essay," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 112-137.
    12. Goetghebuer, Tatiana, 2011. "Productive inefficiency in patriarchal family farms: evidence from Mali," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 34, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    13. Lerman, Zvi & Ruben, Ruerd, 2005. "Why Nicaraguan Peasants Remain in Agricultural Production Cooperatives," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19243, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. Rizov, Marian & Gavrilescu, Dinu & Gow, Hamish & Mathijs, Erik & Swinnen, Johan F. M., 2001. "Transition and Enterprise Restructuring: The Development of Individual Farming in Romania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1257-1274, July.
    15. Mathijs, Erik & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 1997. "Agricultural Decollectivization in Central and Eastern Europe," 1997 Conference, August 10-16, 1997, Sacramento, California 197062, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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