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Comparing EU and US trade liberalisation under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture


  • J-C Bureau
  • L Fulponi
  • L Salvatici


We take bound tariffs under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) as the starting point and attempt to measure how much liberalisation in agriculture will be achieved by the European Union (EU) and the US by the end of the implementation period of the Agreement. Using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) and the Mercantilistic Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) as indicators, we assess the tariff structures chosen by the EU and the US in terms of their welfare and market access impacts. The effects of the actual UR Agreement commitments are compared with alternative tariff reduction schemes such as the 'Swiss formula' and a uniform reduction in tariffs. Copyright 2000, Oxford University Press.

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  • J-C Bureau & L Fulponi & L Salvatici, 2000. "Comparing EU and US trade liberalisation under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 27(3), pages 259-280, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:27:y:2000:i:3:p:259-280

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Gilbert, Guy & Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 19-41, January.
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    11. Ulph, Alistair, 2000. "Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 224-241, March.
    12. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Christophe Bureau & Luca Salvatici, 2005. "Agricultural trade restrictiveness in the European Union and the United States," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 33(s3), pages 479-490, November.
    2. Anania, Giovanni, 2001. "Modeling Agricultural Trade Liberalization. A Review," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20758, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Salvatici, Luca, 2002. "WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: A Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Scenarios for the EU and the US," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24883, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Maria Cipollina & Luca Salvatici, 2008. "Measuring Protection: Mission Impossible?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 577-616, July.
    5. repec:oup:erevae:v:44:y:2017:i:4:p:592-633. is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Ramos, Maria Priscila, 2007. "Politique Commerciale, Qualité et Environnement: une Application aux Négociations Commerciales entre l’Union Européenne et le Mercosur," MPRA Paper 12640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Jean-Christophe Bureau & Houssein Guimbard & Sébastien Jean, 2017. "Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the 21st Century: Has it Done the Business?," Working Papers 2017-11, CEPII research center.
    8. Meilke, Karl D. & Rude, James & Burfisher, Mary E. & Bredahl, Maury E., 2001. "Market Access: Issues And Options In The Agricultural Negotiations," Commissioned Papers 14625, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    9. Bureau Jean-Christophe & Salvatici Luca, 2004. "WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: a Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Proposals for the EU and the US," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-35, March.
    10. Gibson, Paul R. & Wainio, John & Whitley, Daniel B. & Bohman, Mary, 2001. "Profiles Of Tariffs In Global Agricultural Markets," Agricultural Economics Reports 34055, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

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