IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/econjl/v136y2026i673p26-60..html

When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System

Author

Listed:
  • Kehinde F Ajayi
  • Willa H Friedman
  • Adrienne M Lucas

Abstract

We implemented a large-scale randomised controlled trial encompassing 900 junior high schools in Ghana, a country with universal secondary school choice, to study whether providing students and parents with information on school characteristics and selection strategies improved outcomes in a centralised school selection mechanism. Information changed households’ preferences and the characteristics of schools to which they applied. Students gained admission to higher value-added schools, yet they were not more likely to matriculate on time or at all. Incomplete school information was not the only friction. Household shocks and inaccurate preference forecasting likely contributed to continued admission deviations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kehinde F Ajayi & Willa H Friedman & Adrienne M Lucas, 2026. "When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralised School Choice System," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 136(673), pages 26-60.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:136:y:2026:i:673:p:26-60.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueaf046
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Zuchanek, Kevin J., 2025. "Bridging language gaps: Native language school assignment information under immediate acceptance," Ruhr Economic Papers 1172, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Elacqua, Gregory & Kutscher, Macarena, 2023. "Navigating Centralized Admissions: The Role of Parental Preferences in School Segregation in Chile," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13340, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Siqi Pan, 2023. "Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1447-1490, November.
    5. S. Nageeb Ali & Ran I. Shorrer, 2025. "Hedging When Applying: Simultaneous Search with Correlation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(2), pages 571-598, February.
    6. Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024. "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, pages 179-209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Kutscher, Macarena & Nath, Shanjukta & Urzúa, Sergio, 2023. "Centralized admission systems and school segregation: Evidence from a national reform," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    8. Emil Chrisander & Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen, 2023. "Why Do Students Lie and Should We Worry? An Analysis of Non-truthful Reporting," Papers 2302.13718, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
    9. Borger, Michael & Elacqua, Gregory & Jacas, Isabel & Neilson, Christopher & Olsen, Anne Sofie Westh, 2024. "Report cards: Parental preferences, information and school choice in Haiti," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    10. Esther Duflo & Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, 2021. "The Impact of Free Secondary Education: Experimental Evidence from Ghana," NBER Working Papers 28937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Sarah Cohodes & Sean Corcoran & Jennifer Jennings & Carolyn Sattin-Bajaj, 2022. "When Do Informational Interventions Work? Experimental Evidence from New York City High School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29690, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:136:y:2026:i:673:p:26-60.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.