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Has Discrimination Lessened over Time? A Test Using Baseball's All-Star Vote


  • Hanssen, F Andrew
  • Andersen, Torben


Although researchers agree that the black-white wage gap has shrunk over time, they continue to debate the degree to which changes in attitudes, narrowing productivity differences, or corrective legislation are responsible. This article tests for evidence of attitude changes, investigating an area that arguably reflects attitudes more directly than most measures--fan voting for baseball's annual All-Star Game. African American candidates are found to have received substantially fewer votes than other candidates, ceteris paribus, in the 1970s. However, that vote differential declined sharply as time passed and may even have eventually reversed. These results support the view that discriminatory attitudes have diminished. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanssen, F Andrew & Andersen, Torben, 1999. "Has Discrimination Lessened over Time? A Test Using Baseball's All-Star Vote," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(2), pages 326-352, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:37:y:1999:i:2:p:326-52

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew C. Palmer & Randall H. King, 2006. "Has Salary Discrimination Really Disappeared From Major League Baseball?," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(2), pages 285-297, Spring.
    2. Francesca Cornaglia & Naomi E. Feldman, 2017. "Productivity, Wages, and Marriage: A Case Study in Professional Athletics," Working Papers 818, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    3. Brian Volz, 2013. "Race and the Likelihood of Managing in Major League Baseball," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 30-51, March.
    4. Matthew Parrett, 2011. "Customer Discrimination in Restaurants: Dining Frequency Matters," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 87-112, June.
    5. Holmes, Paul, 2011. "New evidence of salary discrimination in major league baseball," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 320-331, June.
    6. Depken II, Craig A. & Ford, Jon M., 2006. "Customer-based discrimination against major league baseball players: Additional evidence from All-star ballots," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1061-1077, December.
    7. Cornaglia, Francesca & Feldman, Naomi E., 2011. "Productivity, Wages, and Marriage: The Case of Major League Baseball," IZA Discussion Papers 5695, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Berri, David J. & Schmidt, Martin B., 2002. "Instrumental versus bounded rationality: a comparison of Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 191-214.
    9. Jeffrey Chu & Saralees Nadarajah & Emmanuel Afuecheta & Stephen Chan & Ying Xu, 2014. "A statistical study of racism in English football," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(5), pages 2915-2937, September.
    10. D Berri & R Simmons, 2007. "Race and the evaluation of signal callers in the national football league," Working Papers 591147, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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