IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v99y2017i2p499-509..html

Social-Optimal Household Food Waste: Taxes and Government Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Bhagyashree Katare
  • Dmytro Serebrennikov
  • H. Holly Wang
  • Michael Wetzstein

Abstract

In 2010, 21% of the total food available for consumption in the United States was wasted at the household level. In response to this waste, a number of counties and U.S. localities have instituted policies (disposal taxes) directed toward reducing this waste. However, currently there is no federal food-waste disposal tax. The aim of this paper is to establish a theoretical foundation for household food waste, and based on this theory, to determine the social-optimal food-waste (disposal) tax, along with a government incentive. The theory unravels the interrelation between social food insecurity and external environmental costs, which is not generally considered by households when they waste food. A social-optimal disposal tax and government incentive involve Pigovian mechanisms and governmental expenditures. For a zero level of food waste, the social-optimal disposable tax and government incentive approach infinity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhagyashree Katare & Dmytro Serebrennikov & H. Holly Wang & Michael Wetzstein, 2017. "Social-Optimal Household Food Waste: Taxes and Government Incentives," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(2), pages 499-509.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:99:y:2017:i:2:p:499-509.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aaw114
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • Q51 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Valuation of Environmental Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:99:y:2017:i:2:p:499-509.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.