On Risky Behavior In Bimatrix Games
The experiment engaging 50 participants was performed to model and identify the determinants of the players’ risky behavior. Here, a questionnaire and a bimatrix game containing the negative/zero payoffs were used to identify the players’ motives to play risky strategies. Besides the concrete form of the payoffs, the individual risk attitudes were also proved to be statistically significant for risky behavior of the players.
Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7656, David K. Levine.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
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