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How Income Inequality Affects Voter Turnout

Author

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  • Deniz Guvercin

    (Istanbul Arel University, Istanbul, Turkey)

Abstract

Determinants of voter turnout have been extensively researched for years. However, there are few studies that explore the link between inequality and voter turnout in all dimensions. There has been sufficient empirical research reporting that income inequality affects negatively voter turnout. This study brings new insight by considering interaction and U-turn relation by the empirical evaluation of the link between income inequality and voter turnout. Modelling U-turn relation by the model reveals that there is threshold level where the relation between voter turnout and inequality flips from negative to positive. The model outcome reveals that the impact of inequality on voter turnout is high and positive in countries with high income inequality of above 0,32, and negative in countries with low income inequality of below 0,32. Moreover, adding interaction term with GDP growth rate reveals that if economic growth is positive and significant, the growing inequality tends to reduce voter turnout, which complies with the Schattschneider hypothesis, which is highly referred to in Electoral Politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Deniz Guvercin, 2018. "How Income Inequality Affects Voter Turnout," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 35-48, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2018:i:1:p:35-48
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Income Inequality; Voter Turnout; Schattschneider Hypothesis; U-Turn Relation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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