Determinants of Electoral Outcomes: A simple Test of Meltzer and Richard's Hypothesis
The present study aims to test Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) hypothesis that lower-income individuals vote for candidates who favor higher taxes and more redistribution. Assuming that left-wing parties advocate a general increase in taxation, we estimate a vote function for the French Cantonal elections. We show clear-cut evidence that an increasing proportion of voters receiving social assistance raises the number of votes in favor of left-wing parties. This result highlights the importance of including redistribution aspects when estimating a vote function.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2011|
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- Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
- Cribari-Neto, Francisco, 2004. "Asymptotic inference under heteroskedasticity of unknown form," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 215-233, March.
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