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Taxation of Couples and Marital Status – Simulation of Three Reforms of the Marital Quotient in France

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  • Guillaume Allègre
  • Hélène Périvier
  • Muriel Pucci

Abstract

[eng] In France, married couples or couples in civil partnerships must declare their resources jointly and are allocated two tax units. This tax system, referred to as the marital quotient, represents a financial package of around 10 billion euros. Using the Ines microsimulation model, we simulate three reforms of this system: an individualisation of taxation, a reduction of marital quotient to 1.5 tax units while allowing married couples/couples in civil partnerships to opt for individual taxation and, finally, the capping of the marital quotient at the same level as the family quotient. Individualisation results in the highest tax gain, around 7 billion euros, compared with 3.8 billion when the marital quotient is reduced to 1.5 tax units and 3 billion with the marital quotient cap. With these reforms, 46%, 45% and 7% of couples lose out, respectively. The median losses correspond to 1.5%, 1.3% and 2.6% of the disposable income of the households concerned, respectively. Finally, 60%, 64% and 83% of the losses are in the last three standard of living deciles, respectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Allègre & Hélène Périvier & Muriel Pucci, 2021. "Taxation of Couples and Marital Status – Simulation of Three Reforms of the Marital Quotient in France," Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), issue 526-527, pages 3-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:nse:ecosta:ecostat_2021_526d_1
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.24187/ecostat.2021.526d.2050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomas F. Crossley & Sung-Hee Jeon, 2007. "Joint Taxation and the Labour Supply of Married Women: Evidence from the Canadian Tax Reform of 1988," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 28(3), pages 343-365, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Clément Carbonnier, 2021. "Family-Based Tax and Transfer System – Issues for Income Tax and Other Public Policies," Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), issue 526-527, pages 41-48.
    2. Mathias André & Antoine Sireyjol, 2021. "Redistributive Effects of the Taxation of Couples and Families: A Microsimulation Study of Income Tax," Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), issue 526-527, pages 21-39.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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