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State Ownership in the Russian Economy. Part 1. Its Magnitude And Sectoral Distribution

Author

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  • Sprenger, C.

    (State University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

This article analyzes the extent and sectoral distribution of state ownership in the Russian economy. The different legal forms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia are described. Of-ficial data on the evolution of the size of the state sector is provided, where the size is measured by the number of SOEs, their share in employment, fixed assets, investment and industrial production. Shortcomings of the official ownership classification are highlighted. Next, the sectoral distribution of SOEs and the degree of their internationalization is described. Finally, data on the SOEs that are listed on the stock market is presented. It gives a picture of a much stronger involvement of the government in medium and large sized companies than what can be inferred from the official data. In a second part (to be published in the next issue of this journal) the governance problems and performance effects of state ownership are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Sprenger, C., 2010. "State Ownership in the Russian Economy. Part 1. Its Magnitude And Sectoral Distribution," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 6, pages 120-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2010:i:6:p:120-140
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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2010-6-120-140r.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Irina Denisova & Markus Eller & Timothy Frye & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence from 28 Post-Communist Countries," Working Papers w0105, New Economic School (NES).
    2. Vernikov, Andrei V., 2007. "Russia' banking sector transition: Where to?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2007, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    3. repec:zbw:bofitp:2007_005 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vanteeva, Nadia, 2016. "In the absence of private property rights: Political control and state corporatism during Putin's first tenure," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 41-55.
    2. Fiedorczuk Monika, 2017. "The Specificity of Boards of Directors in Russian Companies," Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, Sciendo, vol. 25(4), pages 96-118, December.
    3. Dolgopyatova, T., 2015. "State Ownership: Quick Privatization or Effective Governance?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 178-183.
    4. Starchenko, N., 2013. "Analysis of the Results of "Small" Privatization in Russia 2010-2013," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 168-172.
    5. Vernikov, Andrei, 2017. "The impact of state-controlled banks on the Russian banking sector," MPRA Paper 77155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Elena Dombrovskaya & Е. Домбровская Н., 2015. "Государственное Предпринимательство: Роль В Экономике И Финансовой Системе России // Public Entrepreneurship: Its Role In The Economy And The Finance System Of Russia," Экономика. Налоги. Право // Economics, taxes & law, ФГОБУ "Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации" // Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation, issue 1, pages 84-91.
    7. Sprenger, C., 2012. "Corporate Governance Russia: of First-order Importance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 154-157.
    8. Berezinets Irina & Ilina Yulia & Muravyev Alexander, 2011. "Owners, Boards, Managers and the Private Benefits of Control: A Study of Dual Class Stock Firms in an Emerging Market," EERC Working Paper Series 11/12e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    9. Abramov, Alexander & Radygin, Alexander & Chernova, Maria, 2017. "State-owned enterprises in the Russian market: Ownership structure and their role in the economy," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23.
    10. Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia & Muravyev, Alexander, 2011. "CEO and Board Characteristics as Determinants of Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange," IZA Discussion Papers 6256, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State-owned enterprises; state ownership; nationalization; corporate governance; state corporation; Russia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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