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Preferences predict who commits crime among young men

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  • Thomas Epper

    (a CNRS, UMR 9221–Lille Economie Management (LEM), 59000 Lille, France;; b IESEG School of Management, UMR 9221–Lille Economie Management (LEM), 59000 Lille, France;; c University of Lille, UMR 9221–Lille Economie Management (LEM), 59000 Lille, France;; d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;)

  • Ernst Fehr

    (d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;; e UBS Center for Economics in Society, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Kristoffer Balle Hvidberg

    (d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;)

  • Claus Thustrup Kreiner

    (d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;)

  • Søren Leth-Petersen

    (d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;)

  • Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen

    (d Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark;)

Abstract

Who commits crime? Theoretically, risk-tolerant and impatient people are more likely to commit crime because they care less about the risks of apprehension and punishment. By linking experimental data on risk tolerance and impatience of young men to administrative crime records, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. For example, crime rates are 8 to 10 percentage points higher for the most risk-tolerant people compared to the most risk averse. A theoretical implication is that those who are most prone to commit crime are also those who are least responsive to stricter law enforcement. Risk tolerance and impatience significantly predict property crime, while self-control is a stronger predictor of crimes of passion (violent, drug, and sexual offenses).

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Epper & Ernst Fehr & Kristoffer Balle Hvidberg & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Leth-Petersen & Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen, 2022. "Preferences predict who commits crime among young men," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 119(6), pages 2112645119-, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:119:y:2022:p:e2112645119
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emily Oster, 2019. "Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 187-204, April.
    2. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    3. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brenøe, Anne Ardila & Epper, Thomas, 2022. "Parenting values and the intergenerational transmission of time preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    2. Kreiner, Claus Thustrup & Olufsen, Isabel Skak, 2022. "Is inequality in subjective well-being meritocratic? Danish evidence from linked survey and administrative data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 336-367.
    3. Thomas, Ranjeeta & Galizzi, Matteo M. & Moorhouse, Louisa & Nyamukapa, Constance & Hallett, Timothy B., 2024. "Do risk, time and prosocial preferences predict risky sexual behaviour of youths in a low-income, high-risk setting?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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