IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mth/ieb888/v3y2017i1p1-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Model of Lobbying and Social Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Jacob Loree

Abstract

Lobbying is an immense part of the political process. The ability for firms and industries to influence public policy, however, has been seen as a societal ill ¨C even when it benefits the industry. This paper investigates how different types of lobbying affects industries as well as society as a whole. This is one of the first papers in this field of research to investigate societal effects. The results vary by type of lobbying. Protection and regulation lobbying benefit the industry but harm society as a whole. Subsidy lobbying benefits both industry and society given that the government¡¯s additional subsidy expenditure comes from a surplus. If not, society¡¯s welfare is the same as it is shifting subsidy from one industry to another. Using these results, policy suggestions would be to move away from protectionism and removing regulation as a society benefitting technique to using subsidies to boost industries.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Loree, 2017. "A Model of Lobbying and Social Welfare," Issues in Economics and Business, Macrothink Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 1-8, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mth:ieb888:v:3:y:2017:i:1:p:1-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ieb/article/view/11462
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ieb/article/view/11462
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brock, William A & Magee, Stephen P, 1978. "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 246-250, May.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    3. Krugman, Paul R, 1987. "Is Free Trade Passe?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 131-144, Fall.
    4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III : Cournot competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 947-968, June.
    5. Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
    6. Michaelis, Peter, 1994. "Regulate us, please!: On strategic lobbying in Cournot-nash oligopoly," Kiel Working Papers 626, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    7. Horst Raff, 2001. "Preferential Trade Liberalization Under Cournot Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 455-461, August.
    8. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mario Tello Pacheco, 2022. "The Political Economy of Trade Barriers in Peru," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(74), pages 71-107, July.
    2. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.
    3. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    4. Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
    5. repec:jes:wpaper:y:2012:v:4:p:736-746 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Liviu-George Maha & Andreea-Nicoleta Donici & Andreea Maha, 2012. "Limits And Difficulties In Implementing The Strategic Trade Policy," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4(4), pages 736-746, December.
    7. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Eun‐Soo Park & Howard J. Wall, 2004. "Endogenous Export Subsidies And Welfare Under Domestic Cost Heterogeneity," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 347-366, November.
    8. Alan V. Deardorff, 2004. "Who Makes the Rules of Globalization?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1301, CESifo.
    9. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1997. "Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 402-424, October.
    10. Colacicco, Rudy, 2024. "Strategic trade policy in general oligopolistic equilibrium: The case of import tariffs," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
    11. Pokrivcak, Jan, 2007. "Economics and Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements," Working Papers 7286, TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements.
    12. Ryuzo Sato & Rama Ramachandran & Shunichi Tsutsui, 1991. "Incomplete Appropriability of R&D and the Role of Strategies and Cultural Factors in International Trade: A Japanese Case," NBER Working Papers 3797, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Baldwin, Robert E, 1992. "Are Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 804-829, June.
    14. Mordechal Kreinin & Elias Dinopoulos, 1995. "Protection of industry," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 179-196, April.
    15. McCalla, Alex F., 1993. "Agricultural Trade Liberalization: The Ever Elusive Grail," 1993 Annual Meeting, August 1-4, Orlando, Florida 271407, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Anuj J. Mathew & Arijit Mukherjeea, 2011. "Strict environmental policy: An incentive for FDI," Faculty Working Papers 08/11, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
    17. P. Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hak-Loh, 2001. "Endogenous tariff creation and tariff diversion in a customs union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 495-518, March.
    18. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.
    19. Labson, B. Stephen & Rausser, Gordon C., 1992. "Modeling Phased Reduction of Distortionary Policies in the U.S. Wheat Market Under Alternative Macroeconomic Environments," Staff General Research Papers Archive 502, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    20. Yochanan Shachmurove & Uriel Spiegel, 2004. "Size Does Matter: International Trade and Population Size," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-035, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    21. Koichi Kagitani, 2009. "Political Economy Of Strategic Export Policy In A Differentiated Duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 236-252, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mth:ieb888:v:3:y:2017:i:1:p:1-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Technical Support Office The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Technical Support Office to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ieb .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.