IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mof/journl/ppr14_03_06.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Firms’ Liquidity Assets and Workers’ Claims

Author

Listed:
  • Mariko Tanaka

    (Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Musashino University)

Abstract

Primary stakeholders for a firm include shareholders, banks, other creditors, and employees (workers). This study pays special attention to the role of employees, which has rarely been analyzed in an explicit form in the field of corporate finance. We show that the presence of workers’ claims can have great influence on firms’ financial operations, particularly on accumulation of liquidity assets. In general, workers’ claims tend to be paid before other claims even when firms face with liquidity shortages. Thus, in an economy where workers’ claims are given priority, companies may fail to raise sufficient funds due to their excessive burden to pay workers’ claims. To forestall such fund shortages, firms may accumulate liquidity assets in advance. Liquidity assets, though far less profitable, can help cover unexpected fund shortages. This study finds that firms tend to accumulate more liquidity assets preemptively in line with growth in workers’ claims. This finding indicates that the presence of workers’ claims is an important factor behind an increase in liquidity assets of firms and that labor-intensive firms with greater workers’ claims tend to accumulate more liquidity assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariko Tanaka, 2018. "Firms’ Liquidity Assets and Workers’ Claims," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 14(3), pages 511-526, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:mof:journl:ppr14_03_06
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/pp_review/ppr14_03_06.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ashby H. B. Monk, 2008. "The Knot of Contracts: The Corporate Geography of Legacy Costs," Economic Geography, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 84(2), pages 211-235, April.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
    3. Chang, Chun, 1992. "Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract between Employees and Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1141-1158, July.
    4. Ghaly, Mohamed & Dang, Viet Anh & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos, 2015. "Cash holdings and employee welfare," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 53-70.
    5. Hashimoto, Masanori & Raisian, John, 1985. "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 721-735, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2007. "International Reserves: Precautionary Versus Mercantilist Views, Theory and Evidence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-214, April.
    2. Bruinshoofd Allard & Kool Clemens, 2002. "The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity in the Netherlands," Research Memorandum 014, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Paul Pelzl & María Teresa Valderrama, 2019. "Capital regulations and the management of credit commitments during crisis times," DNB Working Papers 661, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    4. David Kucera, 1998. "Unemployment and External and Internal Labor Market Flexibility: A Comparative View of Europe, Japan, and the United States," SCEPA working paper series. 1998-21, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
    5. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Niepelt, Dirk, 2019. "On the equivalence of private and public money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 27-41.
    6. Chatterji, Shurojit; Ghosal, Sayantan, 2010. "Liquidity, moral hazard and bank crises," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 27, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    7. Raddatz, Claudio, 2006. "Liquidity needs and vulnerability to financial underdevelopment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 677-722, June.
    8. Drobetz, Wolfgang & Pensa, Pascal & Wöhle, Claudia B., 2004. "Kapitalstrukturtheorie in Theorie und Praxis: Ergebnisse einer Fragebogenuntersuchung," Working papers 2004/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    9. Fabio Castiglionesi & Wolf Wagner, 2012. "Turning Bagehot on His Head: Lending at Penalty Rates When Banks Can Become Insolvent," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(1), pages 201-219, February.
    10. Shekhar Aiyar & Charles W. Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, 2015. "How to Strengthen the Regulation of Bank Capital: Theory, Evidence, and A Proposal," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 27(1), pages 27-36, March.
    11. Kevin F. Kiernan & Vladimir Yankov & Filip Zikes, 2021. "Liquidity Provision and Co-insurance in Bank Syndicates," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2021-060, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Guerini, Mattia & Moneta, Alessio & Napoletano, Mauro & Roventini, Andrea, 2020. "The Janus-Faced Nature Of Debt: Results From A Data-Driven Cointegrated Svar Approach," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 24-54, January.
    13. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    14. Hajime Tomura, 2010. "Liquidity Transformation and Bank Capital Requirements," Staff Working Papers 10-22, Bank of Canada.
    15. Volodymyr Babich & Simone Marinesi & Gerry Tsoukalas, 2021. "Does Crowdfunding Benefit Entrepreneurs and Venture Capital Investors?," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 23(2), pages 508-524, March.
    16. Challe, Edouard & Le Grand, François & Ragot, Xavier, 2013. "Incomplete markets, liquidation risk, and the term structure of interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2483-2519.
    17. Matthew Canzoneri & Robert Cumby & Behzad Diba, 2015. "Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2-3), pages 383-414, March.
    18. Brutti, Filippo, 2008. "Legal enforcement, public supply of liquidity and sovereign risk," MPRA Paper 13949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Philippe Aghion & Emmanuel Farhi & Enisse Kharroubi, 2019. "Monetary Policy, Product Market Competition and Growth," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 86(343), pages 431-470, July.
    20. Munehisa Kasuya, 2003. "Regime-Switching Approach to Monetary Policy Effects: Empirical Studies using a Smooth Transition Vector Autoregressive Model," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series Research and Statistics D, Bank of Japan.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liquidity shock; control right; workers’ claims;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mof:journl:ppr14_03_06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Policy Research Institute (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/prigvjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.