Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion
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- Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2011. "Revenue Equalization Systems in a Federation with Tax Evasion," Working Papers - Economics wp2011_06.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
References listed on IDEAS
- Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2010. "Mobility and Fiscal Imbalance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 63(4), pages 1023-1053, December.
- Robin Boadway, 2004. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 211-254.
- Baretti, Christian & Huber, Bernd & Lichtblau, Karl, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," Munich Reprints in Economics 20129, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Christian Baretti & Bernd Huber & Karl Lichtblau, 2002. "A Tax on Tax Revenue: The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(6), pages 631-649, November.
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- repec:kap:itaxpf:v:24:y:2017:i:5:d:10.1007_s10797-016-9436-x is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
Keywordsfiscal federalism; equalization; marginal cost of public funds; tax evasion;
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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