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Führt Google Shopping zu einer neuen Art von Wettbewerbsproblem?


  • Blanckenburg Korbinian von

    () (Hochschule Ostwestfalen-Lippe, Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsmathematik, Liebigstraße 87, 32657 Lemgo, Tel.: (05261) 702 5536)


This paper is concerned with the question of how to deal with Google Shopping’s position on online markets in order to prevent harm to public welfare. From the perspective of sellers and buyers of goods and services in Germany, Google can be seen as a gatekeeper to the Internet and thus as an essential facility. It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good. Therefore, welfare-optimal rules must be adhered. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among the sellers to get the maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The proposed solution in this paper provides a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product for which a quantitative independent contribution should be required instead of a fee.

Suggested Citation

  • Blanckenburg Korbinian von, 2014. "Führt Google Shopping zu einer neuen Art von Wettbewerbsproblem?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 63(3), pages 240-256, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:63:y:2014:i:3:p:240-256

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Haucap, Justus & Kehder, Christiane, 2013. "Suchmaschinen zwischen Wettbewerb und Monopol: Der Fall Google," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 44, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2007. "The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    3. Giacomo Luchetta, 2013. "Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 83-118.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wiebke Roß & Jens Weghake, 2015. "10 Jahre YouTube: Von dem Aufstieg einer Plattform und der Entwicklung neuer Märkte zum Kollateralschaden einer Google-Regulierung?," TUC Working Papers in Economics 0014, Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Clausthal (Department of Economics, Technical University Clausthal).
    2. Roß Wiebke & Weghake Jens, 2015. "10 Jahre YouTube: Von dem Aufstieg einer Plattform und der Entwicklung neuer Märkte zum Kollateralschaden einer Google-Regulierung? / 10 Years YouTube: From the Arising of a Platform and the Developme," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 195-220, January.
    3. Budzinski, Oliver, 2016. "Aktuelle Herausforderungen der Wettbewerbspolitik durch Marktplätze im Internet," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 103, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item


    Google Shopping; Market Power; Competition Law; Monopoly; Google Shopping; Marktmacht; Wettbewerbsrecht; Monopol;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services


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