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A posztszovjet gazdasági rendszer Oroszországban: ipari feudalizmus?
[The post-Soviet economic system in Russia: industrial feudalism?]

Author

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  • Ericson, Richard E.

Abstract

A 20. század végének orosz gazdaságát elemezve, a szerző ipari feudalizmusnaknevezi ezt a rendszert, amely alapjaiban tér el a világon megfigyelhető modern piaci rendszerektől. Az eddigi átalakítások lerombolták a szovjet parancsgazdaságot, s a kialakuló intézményi vákuumban a komplex piaci közvetítés helyét a személyes kapcsolatokon alapuló hálózatok foglalják el. Ericson párhuzamot von az európai modern piacgazdaságot megelőző feudalizmus és az orosz átalakulást jellemző ipari feudalizmus között.

Suggested Citation

  • Ericson, Richard E., 2000. "A posztszovjet gazdasági rendszer Oroszországban: ipari feudalizmus? [The post-Soviet economic system in Russia: industrial feudalism?]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 23-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:295
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Susan J Linz & Gary Krueger, 1998. "Enterprise Restructuring in Russia's Transition Economy: Formal and Informal Mechanisms," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 40(2), pages 5-52, July.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30725664 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Richard E. Ericson, 1991. "The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 11-27, Fall.
    5. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    6. Barry Ickes & Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, 1997. "End of the Tunnel? The Effects of Financial Stabilization in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 50, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    7. Susan J Linz, 1997. "Russian Firms in Transition: Champions, Challengers and Chaff*," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 39(2), pages 1-36, July.
    8. Pryor, Frederic L., 1980. "Feudalism as an economic system," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 56-77, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
    • O52 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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