Achievable Hierarchies In Voting Games
Previous work by Diffo Lambo and Moulen [Theory and Decision 53, 313â€“325 (2002)] and Felsenthal and Machover [The Measurement of Voting Power, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (1998)], shows that all swap preserving measures of voting power are ordinally equivalent on any swap robust simple voting game. Swap preserving measures include the Banzhaf, the Shapleyâ€“Shubik and other commonly used measures of a priori voting power. In this paper, we completely characterize the achievable hierarchies for any such measure on a swap robust simple voting game. Each possible hierarchy can be induced by a weighted voting game and we provide a constructive proof of this result. In particular, the strict hierarchy is always achievable as long as there are at least five players. Copyright Springer 2006
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Volume (Year): 61 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Joël Moulen, 2002. "Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 313-325, December.