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A theory of underwriters’ risk management in a firm-commitment initial public offering

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  • Edmund Mantell

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Abstract

A cynosure of the academic literature relating to initial public offerings (IPOs) is the question of why they are “mispriced” so frequently. The large and growing literature addressing this question is evidence as to its intractability. This paper develops a theory of underwriters’ behavior suggesting that they will exploit their private information to minimize the bilateral risks to themselves of firm-commitment IPOs. That minimization may cause them to knowingly underprice the issue. The main result in this paper is based, in part, on the premise that the random character of the investors’ demand for shares in the secondary market, given the spread, is governed by an estimable conditional probability distribution. The underwriters exploit their private knowledge of that probability distribution to influence the number of shares in the offering in such a way as to minimize their expected loss function. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Edmund Mantell, 2016. "A theory of underwriters’ risk management in a firm-commitment initial public offering," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 179-193, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:rqfnac:v:46:y:2016:i:1:p:179-193
    DOI: 10.1007/s11156-014-0466-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bradley, Daniel J. & Jordan, Bradford D., 2002. "Partial Adjustment to Public Information and IPO Underpricing," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(04), pages 595-616, December.
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    3. Edelen, Roger M. & Kadlec, Gregory B., 2005. "Issuer surplus and the partial adjustment of IPO prices to public information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 347-373, August.
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    5. Sherman, Ann E., 2005. "Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 615-649, December.
    6. Hanley, Kathleen Weiss, 1993. "The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial adjustment phenomenon," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 231-250, October.
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    9. Carl R. Chen & Nancy J. Mohan, 2002. "Underwriter Spread, Underwriter Reputation, and IPO Underpricing: A Simultaneous Equation Analysis," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3&4), pages 521-540.
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    11. Habib, Michel A & Ljungqvist, Alexander P, 2001. "Underpricing and Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses in IPOs: Theory and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 433-458.
    12. Hoa Nguyen & William Dimovski & Robert Brooks, 2010. "Underpricing, Risk Management, Hot Issue and Crowding out Effects: Evidence From the Australian Resources Sector Initial Public Offerings," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(03), pages 333-361.
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    15. Ritter, Jay R, 1991. " The Long-run Performance of Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 3-27, March.
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    1. repec:kap:rqfnac:v:51:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11156-017-0677-2 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm-commitment IPO; Underwriting risk management; Asymmetric information; G24; G32; K22;

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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