Piracy, Inc.—on the bearing of the firm analogy to pirate organization
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DOI: 10.1007/s11138-010-0106-4
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- Paul Walker, 2016. "Simple Models of a Human-Capital-Based Firm: a Reference Point Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 7(1), pages 219-247, March.
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
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