IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v35y1980i1p59-74.html

Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control

Author

Listed:
  • Gene Mumy

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Gene Mumy, 1980. "Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 59-74, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:1:p:59-74
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00154749
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00154749
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00154749?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    2. Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
    3. Goldberg, Victor P, 1974. "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 461-492, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. John Pezzey, 2003. "Emission Taxes and Tradeable Permits A Comparison of Views on Long-Run Efficiency," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(2), pages 329-342, October.
    2. Schöb, Ronnie, 1995. "Choosing the right instrument: Environmental policy in the presence of a double dividend," Discussion Papers, Series II 265, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Philippe Quirion, 2004. "Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(3), pages 337-359, November.
    4. Stuart Mestelman, 1984. "The social choice of alternative corrective devices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 55-71, January.
    5. Siegmeier, Jan & Mattauch, Linus & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2018. "Capital beats coal: How collecting the climate rent increases aggregate investment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 366-378.
    6. Pezzey, John C.V. & Jotzo, Frank, 2010. "Tax-Versus-Trading and Free Emission Shares as Issues for Climate Policy Design," Research Reports 95049, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
    7. Lambie, Neil Ross, 2009. "The role of real options analysis in the design of a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme," 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia 47626, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    8. Cropper, Maureen L & Oates, Wallace E, 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 675-740, June.
    9. Ronnie Schöb, 1996. "Choosing the right instrument," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(4), pages 399-416, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bommer, Rolf, 1995. "Environmental policy and industrial competitiveness: The pollution haven hypothesis reconsidered," Discussion Papers, Series II 262, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    2. Andr, Francisco J. & Gonzlez, Paula & Porteiro, Nicols, 2009. "Strategic quality competition and the Porter Hypothesis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 182-194, March.
    3. Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(1), pages 23-34, January.
    4. Robert A. Leone & John E. Jackson, 1981. "The Political Economy of Federal Regulatory Activity: The Case of Water-Pollution Controls," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 231-276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Tsjalle van der Burg & Aloys Prinz, 2010. "Empowering Firm Owners by Separating Voting from Buying and Selling Shares," Review of Social Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 68(1), pages 69-91.
    6. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    7. Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, 2025. "Policy Evolution under the Clean Air Act," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Economics of Environment, Climate Change, and Wine Selected Papers of Robert N Stavins Volume 3 (2011–2023), chapter 10, pages 267-298, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Helfand, Gloria E, 1991. "Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 622-634, June.
    9. Partha Gangopadhyay & Shyam Nath, 2001. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Local Expenditure," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 38(13), pages 2379-2391, December.
    10. Kort, P.M., 1992. "The Effects of Marketable Pollution Permits on the Firm's Optimal Investment Policies," Papers 9242, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    11. Stavins, Robert, 2005. "The Effects of Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation," Working Paper Series rwp05-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    12. Abrego, Lisandro & Perroni, Carlo, 1999. "Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 463-483, April.
    13. Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 353-378, June.
    14. Clas Eriksson, 2011. "Home bias in preferences and the political economics of agricultural protection," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 92(1), pages 5-23.
    15. Peifang Yang & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2016. "Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(4), pages 773-788, December.
    16. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2022. "Permit Markets with Political and Market Distortions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(1), pages 227-255, May.
    17. Hanna Shevchenko, 2017. "Regulatory Policy And Optimization Of Investment Resource Allocation In The Model Of Functioning Of Recreation Industry," Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", vol. 3(1).
    18. Stuart Mestelman, 1984. "The social choice of alternative corrective devices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 55-71, January.
    19. Lambert Schoonbeek & Frans Vries, 2009. "Environmental taxes and industry monopolization," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 94-106, August.
    20. Dennis Mueller & Peter Murrell, 1986. "Interest groups and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-145, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:35:y:1980:i:1:p:59-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.