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An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime

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  • Ronald Wintrobe

    (Western University)

Abstract

Recently, not only has dictatorship resurfaced, but a new form of government has appeared that is neither democratic nor dictatorial. There are various names for this new form: “competitive—authoritarian”, “illiberal democracy”, or simply “hybrid”. Some obvious examples are Hungary, Poland and Turkey. Some connect the origin of hybrids in modern times to the rise of populism. Populism is connected to the illiberal or hybrid idea in that populists tend to repress minorities as a way of appealing to the majority. Authoritarian populists typically divide the population into “us” versus “them”. This paper develops a model of how a hybrid can arise from democracy. I introduce a “strongman or strongwoman” as a leader who can implement repression and gain power. I develop a simple model of a “hybrid” regime in which repression is less than that under dictatorship but greater than that under liberal democracy. The hybrid regime is a special case of Wintrobe’s general theory of dictatorship, but it goes further than that by endogenizing equilibrium extremism of the regime as well as repression. I show how the hybrid regime reacts to exogenous shocks, and develop optimal policy for other countries and institutions interested in reducing repression (the UN, US or EU) towards hybrids.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald Wintrobe, 2018. "An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 217-233, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:177:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0574-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0574-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497.
    2. Dani Rodrik, 2018. "Populism and the economics of globalization," Journal of International Business Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 1(1), pages 12-33, June.
    3. Adam Przeworski, 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 253-273, June.
    4. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    5. James D. Fearon, 2011. "Self-Enforcing Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(4), pages 1661-1708.
    6. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    7. Wintrobe, Ronald, 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 849-872, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bjørnskov, Christian & Freytag, Andreas & Gutmann, Jerg, 2018. "Coups, Regime Transition, and the Dynamics of Press Freedom," Working Paper Series 1225, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Giray Gozgor, 2020. "The Role of Economic Uncertainty in Rising Populism in the EU," CESifo Working Paper Series 8499, CESifo.
    3. Ekkehard A. Köhler & Daniel Nientiedt, 2023. "Was Walter Eucken a proponent of authoritarian liberalism?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 363-376, June.
    4. Miklós Rosta & László Tóth, 2021. "Is there a demand for autocracies in Europe? Comparing the attitudes of Hungarian and Italian university students toward liberal democratic values inspired by János Kornai," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 217-233, April.
    5. Giray Gozgor, 2022. "The role of economic uncertainty in the rise of EU populism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 229-246, January.

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