The costs of collectivization, per se
The question of collectivization becomes relevant in the post-financial crisis years as characterized by growing criticism of market organization. Collectivization, the social structure distinguishable from the market or central planning agency, can be costly from overspending. In our analytical framework, the political order remains polycentric. The most widely acceptable institutional solution may be budgetary outlay sufficient to meet all demand, and especially when it is recognized that public criticism of market alternatives is often concentrated on moral goods, e.g., health care. The excess burden of collectivization, per se, is the excess of costs over benefits if the collectivity meets individual demand for the good beyond plausible efficiency levels. The costs of collectivization, per se, can be reduced by separated budgets, showing both revenue and outlay for individual budgetary line items, that bring collective spending decisions closer to the accompanying levy of taxes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
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Volume (Year): 159 (2014)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Buchanan, James M., 1976. "Taxation in fiscal exchange," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 17-29.
- Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1974. "Redistribution and the Pareto Criterion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 752-757, September.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124-124.
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