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Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union

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  • Christina Schneider

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Abstract

This paper examines discriminatory membership in the European Union from a game-theoretical perspective. I argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states. EU members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected EU members as to render expansion pareto-efficient. The empirical findings of a probit analysis on the EU accession negotiations and outcomes of all five EU enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim. The EU grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge. Moreover, the candidate’s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Christina Schneider, 2007. "Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 85-102, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:85-102
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9135-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marie Dufour & Joachim Wilde, 2013. "Weak Identification in Probit Models with Endogenous Covariates," Working Papers 95, Institute of Empirical Economic Research, Osnabrueck University, revised 28 Feb 2013.
    2. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2013. "Size versus scope: on the trade-off facing economic unions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 247-267, April.
    3. Oliver Lorz & Gerald Willmann, 2008. "Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-off Facing Economic Unions," Working Papers VIVES Research Centre for Regional Economics 2, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, VIVES Research Centre for Regional Economics.

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