Introduction to the Special Issue on Funding Transportation Infrastructure
There is growing concern around the world about insufficient capacity and poor condition of transportation infrastructure. Congestion on roads and at airports, bottlenecks at seaports and railway terminuses, the dilapidated state of highways and other problems are mounting. Traditional revenue sources such as property and fuel taxes are unlikely to suffice in the future either to pay for adequate maintenance or to fund investments in new and improved infrastructure. Shortages of funds, and increasing support for the user pays principle, are behind calls to give an increased role to user charges such as highway tolls and airport fees related to congestion and other user-imposed costs. And the private sector is increasingly being called upon to help design, finance, build, operate and maintain infrastructure -- often through Public Private Partnerships.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Laetitia Andrieu, 2007.
"Risk in Transport investments,"
THEMA Working Papers
2007-22, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- André De Palma & Nathalie Picard & Laetitia Andrieu, 2012. "Risk in Transport Investments," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00719698, HAL.
- Brian Knight, 2003.
"Parochial Interests and the Centralized Provision of Local Public Goods: Evidence from Congressional Voting on Transportation Projects,"
NBER Working Papers
9748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Knight, Brian, 2004. "Parochial interests and the centralized provision of local public goods: evidence from congressional voting on transportation projects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 845-866, March.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:netspa:v:12:y:2012:i:2:p:183-185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.