Should Independent Board Members with Social Ties to Management Disqualify Themselves from Serving on the Board?
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- M. J. Nowak & M. McCabe, 2003. "Information Costs and the Role of the Independent Corporate Director," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(4), pages 300-307, October.
- Suraj Srinivasan, 2005. "Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 291-334, May.
- Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
- Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
- Randall Morck, 2004. "Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance-Independent Directors and Non-Executive Chairs," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2037, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Nikos Vafeas, 2003. "Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 32(2), Summer.
- Doyle, Jeffrey & Ge, Weili & McVay, Sarah, 2007. "Determinants of weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 193-223, September.
- Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis & Collins, Daniel W. & Kinney Jr., William R., 2007. "The discovery and reporting of internal control deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 166-192, September.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
- Hallock, Kevin F., 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 331-344, September.
- S. Certo & Catherine Dalton & Dan Dalton & Richard Lester, 2008. "Boards of Directorsâ€™ Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Corporate Acquisitions?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 219-230, January.
- Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
- Harry A. Newman & Haim A. Mozes, 1999. "Does the Composition of the Compensation Committee Influence CEO Compensation Practices?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 28(3), Fall.
- Anderson, Ronald C. & Bizjak, John M., 2003. "An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1323-1348, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Muravyev, Alexander & Berezinets, Irina & Ilina, Yulia, 2014.
"The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange,"
International Review of Financial Analysis,
Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 247-261.
- Muravyev, Alexander A. & Berezinets, Irina V. & Ilina, Yulia B., 2013. "The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange," Working Papers 789, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
- Cardow, Andrew & Wilson, Willam, 2014. "In Lombard we trust: The value of independent celebrity directors," MPRA Paper 58111, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:eee:corfin:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:220-244 is not listed on IDEAS
- Steven Kaplan & Janet Samuels & Jeffrey Cohen, 2015. "An Examination of the Effect of CEO Social Ties and CEO Reputation on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 103-117, January.
- Ran, Guanggui & Fang, Qiaoling & Luo, Shuai & Chan, Kam C., 2015. "Supervisory board characteristics and accounting information quality: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 18-32.
- Shelagh Campbell & Yingqi Li & Junli Yu & Zhou Zhang, 2016. "The Impact of Occupational Community on the Quality of Internal Control," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 139(2), pages 271-285, December.
- repec:kap:jbuset:v:159:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-018-3785-6 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsCEO compensation; corporate governance; financial reporting quality; independent directors; social network; social ties;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:99:y:2011:i:3:p:399-423. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.