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Blurred Promises: Ethical Consequences of Fine Print Policies in Insurance

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  • Øyvind Kvalnes

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  • Øyvind Kvalnes, 2011. "Blurred Promises: Ethical Consequences of Fine Print Policies in Insurance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 77-86, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:103:y:2011:i:1:p:77-86
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-012-1224-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Ludkovski & Virginia R. Young, 2010. "Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 829-856, December.
    2. Atsushi Takao & Mahito Okura, 2001. "An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market," Journal of Risk Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 291-301, July.
    3. Cummins, J David & Tennyson, Sharon, 1996. "Moral Hazard in Insurance Claiming: Evidence from Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-50, January.
    4. Christopher Parsons, 2003. "Moral Hazard in Liability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 28(3), pages 448-471, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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