Rethinking banking supervision in the EU
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David G. Mayes & María J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2007. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the European Union: Is prompt corrective action partly the solution?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2007-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
- Helge Berger & Carsten Hefeker, 2008. "Does financial integration make banks more vulnerable? Regulation, foreign owned banks, and the lender-of-last resort," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 371-393, February.
- Dirk Schoenmaker & Charles Goodhart, 2006. "Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe," FMG Special Papers sp164, Financial Markets Group.
- Robert Marquez & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, 2001. "Competition Among Regulators," IMF Working Papers 01/73, International Monetary Fund.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:4:y:2008:i:4:p:357-361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.