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A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization

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  • Thomas Döring
  • Jan Schnellenbach

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  • Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach, 2011. "A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 83-102, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:1:p:83-102
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-010-9096-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, November.
    3. Jan Schnellenbach & Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 3-26, February.
    4. Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2001. "On Government Centralization and Budget Referendums: Evidence from Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 615, CESifo.
    5. Feld, Lars P. & Schaltegger, Christoph A. & Schnellenbach, Jan, 2008. "On government centralization and fiscal referendums," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 611-645, May.
    6. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
    2. Paolo Dardanelli & Sean Mueller, 2019. "Dynamic De/Centralization in Switzerland, 1848–2010," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 138-165.
    3. André Kaiser & Stephan Vogel, 2019. "Dynamic De/Centralization in Germany, 1949–2010," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 84-111.
    4. Lorenz Blume & Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Federalism and decentralization—a critical survey of frequently used indicators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 238-264, September.
    5. Peter Schwarz, 2017. "Federalism and horizontal equity across Switzerland and Germany: a new rationale for a decentralized fiscal structure," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 97-116, June.
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federalism; Government centralization; State and local autonomy; Constitutional economics; Institutional evolution; Formal institutions; Bryce Law; Popitz Law; H77; K19; P42; N42; N44; Z10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • P42 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Productive Enterprises; Factor and Product Markets; Prices
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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