A Possible Conflict between Economic Efficiency and Political Pressure
A model of a production externality between two industries facing price uncertainty is specified and a Pigouvian tax introduced and solved using First-Order Conditions (FOC). This solution is then used as a baseline for comparison with results for the level of tax found using an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) where government, as the policy setter, is facing political pressure in the selective environment of the electorate. It is found in the EA solution that if a government faces political pressure in an uncertain economic environment then the settings for the tax may reflect political caution rather than community preferences. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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- Baumol, William J, 1972. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 307-322, June.
- Cacho, Oscar J. & Simmons, Phil, 1999. "A genetic algorithm approach to farm investment," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 43(3), September.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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