Gray marketing and unfair competition
With the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) relaxation of the definitions of cartels, price controls, and market manipulation in July 1998, the Court effectively banned the import of gray goods into the EU. This judgment, restricting parallel importation, raises arguments amongst trademark owners, gray marketers, and consumers. First of all, has the ECJ's judgment connived a situation of unfair competition? Secondly, can the import of gray market goods with genuine trademarks be considered a trademark infringement? Thirdly, is a gray marketer a free rider? To provide the answers to these questions, there is need to investigate the relationships of parallel importation, trademarks and market competition. In this study, the author uses a price dominant model to determine the positions of the trademark owner and the gray marketer. This study finds that parallel importation does not contravene trademark law. In the spirit of free competition, gray marketing activities can develop a situation of fair competition in which social welfare increases. Given the existence of heterogeneous preference of consumers, authorized distributors should offer better levels of service to gain market share. Therefore, the author strongly supports a parallel importation policy. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2002
Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Postal:Suite 650, International Tower, 229 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30303
Phone: (404) 965-1555
Fax: (404) 965-1556
Web page: http://www.iaes.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/11293/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard Harris, 1985.
"Why Voluntary Export Restraints Are 'Voluntary.',"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(4), pages 799-809, November.
- Richard Harris, 1984. "Why Voluntary Export Restraints are 'Voluntary'," Working Papers 559, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1987. "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 265-309, October.
- Patrick Bolton & Giacomo Bonanno, 1988. "Vertical Restraints in a Model of Vertical Differentiation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 555-570. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:30:y:2002:i:2:p:196-204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.